Cutting Your Teeth: Learning from Rare (One or More) Experiences by Charles E. Eesley & Edward B. Roberts
* The authors gratefully acknowledge Diane Burton, Fiona Murray, Jesper Sørensen, Kevin Boudreau, 
James Utterback, Mary Tripsas, Pai-Ling Yin, Per Davidson, Jing Chen, and John Carroll, participants at 
the 2008 NBER Entrepreneurship Research Seminar, Cambridge, MA and at the Academy of 
Management Annual Meeting. Atlanta, GA. Aug. 11-16th, 2006, for extremely helpful comments and 
suggestions on earlier drafts.  All remaining errors are our own. Funding from the MIT Entrepreneurship 
Center is gratefully acknowledged. 
 
 
Cutting Your Teeth: Learning from Rare (One or More) Experiences 
 
 
Charles E. Eesley and Edward B. Roberts
 
Authors are listed in alphabetical order. MIT Sloan School of Management, 50 Memorial Drive, 
Cambridge, MA 02142. eesley@mit.edu; eroberts@mit.edu 
 
Abstract 
In this paper, we explore learning-by-doing in a unique and important setting not previously 
explored- the context of one or more complex experiences encountered in novel circumstances. 
We explore characteristics that lead to learning from small sets of prior experiences. We use data 
from survey responses of 2,111 entrepreneurs to examine performance of startup firms as a 
measure of outcomes produced by learning-by-doing from prior founding experience. Results 
indicate substantial productivity benefits accruing from prior entrepreneurial experience.  The 
paper is the first to exploit panel data on the entire individual history of firm founding to control 
for individual fixed effects.  The paper indicates areas where entrepreneurs show possible 
learning effects, such as the inclination and/or ability to more quickly go through the process of 
recognizing an opportunity, developing it, and executing the exit strategy. 2 
 
1.  Introduction 
Economists as early as Arrow (1962) examined the idea that economic growth is fueled 
by technical change that itself is driven by learning from the activity of production.  Although 
Arrow notes that learning associated with “repetition of essentially the same problem is subject 
to sharply diminishing returns,” few in the decades since have examined the very beginning of 
the learning curve where the problems are more heterogeneous and learning is (purportedly) at 
its most productive.  Our subject here is the beginning of the learning curve where samples of 
experience are small and learning is challenging, yet potentially highly rewarding (Levinthal and 
March, 1993).   
Schumpeter (1934) envisioned entrepreneurship (a wave of creative destruction, in his 
words) as the efficiency inducing engine of the capitalist system.  However, if the view is correct 
that long run economic growth is sustained by a process of learning-by-doing (which drives 
technical change), then it is worthwhile to ask whether the entrepreneurial process itself is 
subject to learning.
1  If there are diminishing returns to learning-by-doing, then an understanding 
of differences in learning rates at the beginning of the curve may be especially important.  The 
relative lack of empirical studies of learning-by-doing in the context of founding new firms is 
surprising given the implications drawn from learning curve studies for competitive strategy and 
“first-mover” advantages (Spence, 1981, Lieberman, 1987).  The contribution of this paper is in 
studying the beginning of the learning curve and in examining the transfer of learning by 
founders to subsequent firms, a novel mechanism of learning spillovers across firms. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Beyond examining learning-by-doing in an important, novel setting, a better understanding of the 
beginning of the learning curve is particularly important for understanding variation in learning rates as 
well as external spillovers.   3 
 
2.  Background 
There is a large literature on learning-by-doing including Spence (1981), Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1983), Jovanovic and Lach (1989), Rosen (1972) and Cabral and Riordan (1994) among 
many others.  Increases in productivity with cumulative production experience have been 
demonstrated in numerous manufacturing settings from airplanes to semiconductors where 
activity is highly repetitive (Rapping, 1965, Irwin and Klenow, 1994, Gruber, 1994, Thornton 
and Thompson, 2001).  Decreases in unit costs with a doubling of cumulative experience are 
estimated to range from 55% to 100% (Dutton and Thomas, 1984).  It is controversial whether 
learning-by-doing should be found in more complex strategic contexts such as new firm 
foundings or acquisitions.  Thus far, the literature on learning-by-doing examines contexts which 
are seemingly quite far from entrepreneurship.  Much of the theoretical work examines 
monopoly or oligopoly settings using models of learning in firms competing in prices or in 
finding an innovation (Cabral and Riordan, 1994).  Increasingly, work on learning-by-doing 
appears to be moving towards examining strategic choices and performance outcomes in 
competitive contexts where firms are price-takers.   
Beyond documenting learning-by-doing, other work has examined the effects of learning 
on competitive outcomes (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988).  Spence (1981) examines implications of 
learning for performance by analyzing competitive interaction in an industry with unit costs 
declining with cumulative output.
2  Empirical work on the chemical industry has shown that 
learning effects are greater in magnitude than economies of scale (Lieberman, 1984).  
Balasubramanian and Lieberman (2008) show that industry learning rates are connected to firm 
performance and higher rates of learning are associated with wider dispersion of profitability and 
                                                 
2 Implications of learning curve models have been derived for production decisions, firm dynamics, and firm 
valuations (Athey and Schmutzler, 2001, Majd and Pindyck, 1989, Mitchell, 2000, Jarmin, 1994, Gaynor, Seider 
and Vogt, 2005).   4 
 
Tobin‟s q.  The learning curve slope has been found to have a high degree of variance across 
organizations (Pisano, Bohmer and Edmondson, 2001, Edmondson, Bohmer and Pisano, 2001).   
If learning has an impact on competitive outcomes, then the question arises about the 
specific mechanisms of this effect.  Closer to the context of interest to the current paper, learning 
has been used to model R&D races, learning curve spillovers and other more strategic types of 
behavior (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1983, Ghemawat and Spence, 1985, Lippman and McCardle, 
1987).  Moving away from examining monopoly or oligopoly, more recent work examines more 
competitive market structures with free entry, exit and price taking firms.
3  Despite much 
theoretical work, little empirical work on competitive outcomes such as concentration and 
industry structure has found strong impacts of learning-by-doing.  If there are large spillovers to 
learning then a weak connection between learning-by-doing and competitive outcomes might be 
expected.   
Finally, another stream of literature has examined the extent to which learning-by-doing 
may spillover outside of the firm (Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980, Levin and Reiss, 1988, Geroski, 
Machin and Van Reenen, 1993).  Most of the literature treats knowledge as a kind of firm-
specific good (Huckman and Pisano, 2006), but there can also be task-specific rather than firm 
specific human capital which may then be transferred outside of the firm (Gibbons and Waldman, 
2004) as well as internally (Thornton and Thompson, 2001).  Empirical work outside of 
economics has begun to explore learning from rare events with intriguing, yet contradictory, 
mixed results (Denrell, 2003; Zollo & Singh, 2004).  Zollo and Singh (2004) find that, in the 
                                                 
3 Petrakis and coauthors (1997) find that mature firms earn rents on their learning despite the fact that 
equilibrium profits are zero.  Zimmerman (1982) looks at the commercialization of new energy 
technologies and finds that learning externalities were present, but only had a small impact on the rate of 
commercialization.  Equilibrium models have shown that learning by doing can endogenize the selection 
of new goods for production (Stokey, 1988).  Other studies have shown that market experience can 
eliminate anomalies to irrationality such as the endowment effect (List, 2003) and that not only learning is 
important, but also organizational forgetting (Benkard, 2000). 5 
 
context of mergers, experience accumulation is non-significant.  Baum and Dahlin (2007) find 
evidence consistent with learning from train crashes.  Some have suggested that learning rates 
may be higher in slightly heterogeneous settings (Haunschild and Sullivan, 2002, Schilling, 
Vidal, Ployhart and Marangoni, 2003).  Other authors have emphasized the undersampling of 
failure (Denrell 2003), or how the distribution of resources can limit learning from unusual 
events (Marcus, Nichols 1999).   
Learning in Entrepreneurial Settings 
Employees gain some of the benefits of learning-by-doing and then may leave to start 
firms based on know-how from their employers (Franco and Filson, 2006).  In terms of the 
entrepreneurial process itself the founders clearly were in a position to learn the most.  The 
original founders of the firm may leave, having learned either something about the process of 
founding a firm, or about their own ability or efficiency which then affects strategic choices in 
the subsequent firm (Jovanovic, 1982).  The current paper makes its contribution in examining a 
different knowledge spillover mechanism: whether entrepreneurs appear to transfer some type of 
learning as a result of the prior founding experience to a subsequent founding.  The challenge for 
such entrepreneurs is that unlike manufacturing settings with large samples of very homogenous 
production experience, the setting of founding a firm is both infrequently encountered and more 
heterogeneous in nature.  Both characteristics are common to the beginning of a learning curve.  
If learning-by-doing can be found in the context of entrepreneurs, then this has important 
implications both for the training of future entrepreneurs and potential policy implications in 
encouraging serial entrepreneurship or early first founding attempts. 
The entrepreneurship literature is beginning to focus on the process of learning among 
entrepreneurs.  Politis (2005) has an extensive review and synthesis of the research on 6 
 
entrepreneurial learning.  Analyses of the impact on performance of founding experience have 
varied, with some showing no effect (Alsos, 1998, Westhead and Wright, 1998) while others 
show performance advantages for multiple entrepreneurs (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper and Woo, 1997, 
Stuart and Abetti, 1990).
4  Although they argue against a learning interpretation, the work most 
closely related to this paper is that by Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2006).  The 
authors argue that a large component of success in entrepreneurship and venture capital can be 
attributed to skill rather than luck and show that entrepreneurs with a track record of success are 
more likely to succeed than first time entrepreneurs.  However, the Gompers et al. sample is 
limited to founders who received venture capital financing, thus the authors lack data on the 
much larger proportion of prior foundings that were not VC funded.  Furthermore, many more 
successful start-ups undergo acquisition rather than IPO since opportunities to go public vary 
with the economic environment and by industry.  Therefore the Gompers et al. analysis may be 
missing many actual prior successes which would tend to bias their estimates.  If, and to what 
extent, small samples of experience result in learning that can be applied successfully in later 
comparable situations remains to be established. 
Definitions 
In discussing rare experiences, we want to be explicit in defining both of those terms. 
First is the term “rare”.  Prior work has not defined precisely the line between inference from 
small samples learning and that of large samples.  We follow the spirit of Zollo and Singh (2004) 
that infrequent events are notoriously more difficult to learn from than more repetitious events 
typically found in learning curve studies.  We extend March and colleagues‟ (1991) definition of 
                                                 
4 Shane (2000) has examined the impact of prior experience on opportunity recognition.  Our focus is on 
differences between entrepreneurs who have heterogeneous levels of prior founding experience.  While 
we cannot directly measure the experience of the founders in recognizing opportunities, our focus is more 
on the overall execution of founding a firm.   7 
 
samples of one or fewer up to samples of n = 10 where each is infrequent.  Experience in 
founding two, three, or even four firms is still rare experience since each founding experience 
uniquely occurs in a different business environment, and encounters new problems that are dealt 
with by the founders.  While learning occurs “on the job”, much of the entrepreneur‟s learning 
may also happen between ventures when outcomes are realized and the entrepreneur has time to 
reflect on what has happened, what worked, and what was a mistake.  Thus, even if the amount 
of experience in the population is small, “rare experience” should not be a relative concept (i.e. 
only two experiences to infer lessons from should still count as “rare” regardless of the average 
number of experiences in the comparison set). 
Second is the term “experience”.  Experience can mean many things and all of them may 
be relevant or legitimate, but in this paper, we are specifically concerned with experience in 
starting a business.  Experience in starting a business varies to some extent depending on the 
industry, location, type of business, the growth intentions of the founders, and many other 
dimensions.  However, a common set of experiences occur in forming and developing a new 
business idea, finding and recruiting co-founders and initial employees, fundraising, and 
assembling the resources necessary to start a new firm. This set is fairly common across 
businesses.  We focus upon a specific type of experience, namely, experience in doing the set of 
activities that are required in founding and setting up a new business. 
The appropriate unit of prior experience is not immediately clear, but we believe that if 
task repetition is the basis for learning, then the number of firms started is the appropriate unit of 
measurement.  If the majority of learning relevant to founding occurs in work experience or life 
experience outside of prior foundings, then we should find that the number of prior firms lacks 
explanatory power.  Since firms develop at different paces in different industries and the wisdom 8 
 
of early decisions is often not known until the founders have experienced some sort of exit event 
(if ever), we propose that the number of new ventures, rather than years with a single venture, is 
a more suitable proxy for the amount of prior experience.
5  Another problem with using the 
number of years of experience is that it implicitly penalizes an entrepreneur who quickly took a 
firm successfully to acquisition or IPO.  Similarly, with focus on the repetitive task, pilots might 
be expected to learn from the number of flights or take-offs and landings, not from the number of 
miles flown.  Firemen should be expected to learn from the number of fires put out and police 
officers from the number of arrests made, not the amount of time on a particular fire or with a 
particular suspect.  Entrepreneurs cannot truly gauge the ultimate success of their actions until 
the final outcome is known. 
The key theoretical claim of interest for the current paper is that prior startup experiences 
lead to higher performance in subsequent ventures due to learning from these rare experiences 
despite the small sample from which to make inferences.  Since organizational learning 
represents an interaction between individuals learning and their organizational context, we 
formulate a series of hypotheses concerning (1) that learning occurs, and (2) characteristics of 
the organizational context which may influence the degree of learning.  We use the model of 
learning-by-doing of Jovanovic and Nyarko (Jovanovic, Nyarko and Griliches, 1995) to relate 
learning-by-doing to firm performance.  The model is an information-theoretic model that 
describes information gained from prior experience as an input into the current efficiency level.  
It is described in greater technical detail in their paper and its advantages in this setting along 
with the setup and results are summarized in Appendix B. 
                                                 
5 Years of experience is not a good measure here because for example, an individual may be moonlighting 
and working part time in another job making the number of „years‟ experience a messy measure.  Our 
analyses were also run with the number of years of prior startup experience but this variable was not 
significant. 9 
 
While higher performance in subsequent ventures would be consistent with a number of 
mechanisms in addition to learning, as a first pass if performance is not higher with founding 
experience then a learning interpretation should be questioned.  Organizational performance in 
entrepreneurial firms is likely to be a noisy proxy for learning.  Nonetheless, since the prior 
entrepreneurial experience of the founders is a major input for a new venture, organizational 
performance is a relevant and appropriate objective measure.  Performance can be seen as a very 
conservative test for learning. For it to be detected, learning must occur at a high enough level to 
impact performance in a large sample of organizations.  Since most studies of learning are within 
organizations, it may well be controversial to suggest that learning which took place within or 
based upon experiences with one firm will readily transfer to a new organization and with 
sufficient power to improve organizational performance (Brown and Duguid, 1991).  
Nonetheless, we believe that the knowledge gained via a founding experience is valuable enough 
that even in the dynamic, turbulent environments characteristic of new firms (Grant, 1996) 
performance improvements should appear. 
Hypothesis 1a: Individuals will exhibit performance improvements as a result of 
learning from prior founding experiences. 
 
An alternative explanation for why performance might appear to improve with prior 
founding experience is that those who choose to start a second firm have higher skill levels than 
those who choose to only start a single firm (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2006).  
If those who start multiple firms are also more persistent or more talented than those who start 
only one firm, then we would also observe average performance improvements as lower skill 
individuals exit from entrepreneurship.  We exploit the panel structure of the data, which 
includes observations of multiple firm foundings for many individuals to implement a regression 
including individual fixed effects to control for time-invariant factors from the individual 10 
 
influencing performance.
6  Also, conditioning on one firm founding, the results should not show 
performance improvements with prior founding experience if underlying skill or persistence is 
the only component.  In addition, conditioning on at least one prior firm founding addresses the 
problem that some of the entrepreneurs with a single founding may be lifestyle entrepreneurs 
who are starting a firm with no intentions to grow or sell it.  If there is some form of learning in 
addition to differential skill levels, then conditioning on high persistence (more than one firm 
founding) we expect to continue to observe performance improvements with prior foundings. 
Hypothesis 1b: Conditioning on individuals with at least one prior founding experience 
or controlling for individual effects, organizational performance will improve with the 
number of prior founding experiences. 
 
Various mechanisms have been proposed for the variation between organizations in 
learning rates (Argote and Epple, 1990).  Our second set of hypotheses focuses on characteristics 
of the prior experience.  Whether the event turns out as a success may influence what knowledge 
the individual takes away from a previous experience and how she or he applies that knowledge 
to future situations (Cyert and March, 1963).  Starbuck and Hedberg (2001) review the cognitive 
and behavioral research on how success impacts learning, and identify a number of interesting 
mechanisms at work. Yet, their review shows the difficulty in formulating compelling arguments 
for success/failure having a straightforward impact on levels of learning.  Entrepreneurs evaluate 
their performance much differently than researchers do (Roberts, 1991), and when links between 
actions and outcomes are ambiguous, sensitivity to levels of performance may decrease (Lant 
and Mezias, 1992).  Politis (2005) argues that prior experiences of success or failure may 
condition the mode of learning from experience.  Prior success can show a path forward, but it 
                                                 
6 These may include individual-level factors such as ability or persistence which without individual fixed 
effects would exert an upward bias on estimates of learning-by-doing and also factors such as a 
preference for variety or for multiple “lifestyle” businesses or the inability to hold down wage 
employment which would exert a downward bias in studies lacking observations on multiple firm 
foundings. 11 
 
may not spur much additional thought about why the success occurred.  McGrath and Gunther 
(1999) emphasize that failure can have positive benefits by increasing the search for new 
opportunities.  Failure can create greater variety in actions as the individual searches for 
strategies to reduce uncertainty (March, 1991).  However, we simplify the arguments by noting 
that in this context, prior experiences that were more successful allow the entrepreneur to 
experience more of the startup process, rather than having it end early; they show the entire path 
to success, rather than just part of it. 
Hypothesis 2a: Individuals who have experienced success (as evidenced by prior IPOs 
or acquisitions) will exhibit higher performance improvements from prior founding 
experiences. 
 
In psychology, a transfer effect is the beneficial impact of a prior event on the 
performance of a subsequent event (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002).  The similarity between 
the characteristics of events influences the probability of positive outcomes from transfer (Argote, 
Ingram, 2000). The probability of negative outcomes can increase when events are dissimilar yet 
lessons from prior experience are applied anyway (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002).  We suggest 
that transfer effects occur between the individual and the organizational levels of analysis.  An 
individual can bring transfer effects, perhaps in the form of routines from prior founding 
experience to the benefit (or detriment) of a new organization‟s performance, depending on the 
similarity of industrial contexts (Cohen and Bacdayan, 1994; Zander and Kogut, 1995).  As 
Gavetti et al. (2005) indicate, the problem with forming strategy by analogy is that it requires 
both a breadth of prior experience to draw from (which may not be available) and a good fit 
between the relevant dimensions of the current, novel situation and the prior situation.  A certain 
level of learning must have already taken place.  Inferences may be misapplied or the wrong 
inferences from the beginning (Finkelstein and Haleblian, 2002).  Indeed, Henderson and Clark 12 
 
(1990) argue that if the environment is characterized by demands for architectural innovations in 
the firm, which do not match the architecture of the manager‟s prior organization, learning by 
analogy may prove difficult.  Furthermore, examining the impact of the similarity of experience 
will allow us an additional test of whether higher performance for subsequent firms is a learning 
effect or a result of higher skill for serial entrepreneurs.  Unless higher skill founders tend to 
remain in the same industrial context, better performance for those with experience in a similar 
industry compared to those with prior experience in a different industry should be a sign of 
learning as the correct mechanism. 
Hypothesis 2b: Individuals who remain in similar contexts (as evidenced by industry 
SIC code) will exhibit higher performance improvements from prior founding 
experiences. 
 
3. Methods 
Data and Sample 
We analyze data from a novel survey administered in 2003 to all MIT alumni who had 
previously self-identified as founding at least one new venture.  Out of 8,242 alumni who had 
indicated that they had founded a company, 2,111 founders completed surveys, representing a 
response rate of 25.6%.
7  Examining the firm names and founding years, we identified and 
dropped 44 duplicate observations where multiple cofounders reported on the same firm.  
Industries covered include aerospace, architecture, biomedical, chemicals, consumer products, 
consulting, electronics, energy, finance, law, machine tools, publishing, software, 
telecommunications, other services, as well as other manufacturing.  A total of 3,156 alumni 
indicated that they had started multiple companies, of whom 960 completed the survey for a 
                                                 
7 Appendix A shows t-tests of the null hypothesis that the average (observed) characteristics of the responders and 
non-responders are the same statistically, for both the 2001 and 2003 surveys.  This table has been reported 
previously but is included here for the reader‟s convenience (Hsu, Roberts and Eesley, 2007). 13 
 
multi-founder response rate of 30.4%.
8  A total of 1,107 single-firm founders responded to the 
survey giving a 21.8% response rate out of the 5,086 single-firm alumni founders.  Some of these 
1,107 single-firm founders may later become multiple entrepreneurs, however since we are 
looking at the learning effects of prior founding experience on current firm performance, this is 
not a problem for our current research.  The founders reported information on up to five firms 
which they had founded across their careers yielding a total of 3,698 firm observations.  There is 
an average of 1.79 firms founded per individual or 3.85 firms per individual who founded more 
than 1 firm.  The founders were also asked for the total number of firms they had attempted to 
found over the course of their career and 80 indicated having founded more than 5 firms (up to 
11).  The average number of firms per individual by this measure is 2.13 so we appear to have 
captured data on the vast majority of firm foundings.  To provide still more information about 
these companies including current sales, employment, industry category and location, this new 
MIT database was further updated from the records of Compustat (for public companies) and 
Dun & Bradstreet (private companies).
9  For consistency in the country and institutional context, 
the 1,121 firms which were identified as having been founded outside of the U.S. were dropped 
from the analysis.  Information on sales was adjusted for inflation to constant dollars. 
Determining the appropriate level of analysis is a problem when thinking about learning 
from small samples. While teams of multiple co-founders are more likely to start a new firm, as 
well as be more successful in their firms (Roberts, 1991), we only have complete founder 
information on prior startup experience for one entrepreneur from each team. Previous findings 
                                                 
8 To be clear, the vast majority of these individuals were „serial‟ entrepreneurs.  They have left the first firm before 
founding a subsequent firm rather than owning multiple businesses at the same time. 
9 Successful matches were found for 80% of the company names in the D&B database.  A firm is 
included in the Dun and Bradstreet database when it needs to obtain a credit rating. An analysis of Dun 
and Bradstreet's coverage compared to other sampling sources for small businesses concluded that there 
was not a bias towards larger firms (Aldrich, Kalleberg, Marsden and Cassell, 1989). 14 
 
of strong homophily among founding teams indicate that the prior founding experience of one 
entrepreneur may be a good proxy for that of the team (Ruef, Aldrich and Carter, 2003) and the 
results are robust to using only the single-founder teams and to using all co-founded teams.  To 
eliminate concerns of biases in the Dun & Bradstreet data, the analyses are also run on only the 
subset of firms for which the founders provided more detailed revenues and employee data (each 
founder chose one firm to provide more detailed data).  While we lose the panel structure, this 
sub-sample also provides us with more detailed information on control variables and increases 
the confidence in our results.  Due to skipped survey items and missing data we limit our primary 
performance analyses on revenues to the 964 firms (single founder and co-founded teams) for 
which we have complete data.  For our analysis on lags between firm foundings, we have 
complete data on a sample of 587 firms.  Meaningful numbers of foundings begin in the 1950s, 
therefore we restrict our analysis to firms founded from 1950-2001.  A key feature of this dataset 
is its long time horizon allowing us to analyze entire entrepreneurial careers.     
Measures 
Dependent Variables.  Since our focus is on measuring the performance effects of 
learning, we use revenues, acquisition, IPO, employees, and lag between foundings as the 
dependent variables.  Profit might be a better indicator, but we lack adequate profit data to use 
that measure.  The pair-wise correlation between employee size and log revenues was -0.024, so 
we do not believe revenue is picking up only size effects.  No single outcome measure is ideal.  
Using acquisitions has the drawback of not observing the valuation of the acquisition as 
compared to the valuation at the time of funding.  Similarly, using IPOs does not identify the 
valuation of the firm at the time of the IPO, or the post-IPO performance of the stock, or the 
personal financial benefits to the founders or the initial investors.  Both IPOs and acquisitions 15 
 
apply only to a subset of foundings, not to all of them, whereas revenues are a common goal of 
all companies.  Many studies of entrepreneurship use the fact of an IPO as a measure of success 
(Gompers, Kovner, Lerner and Scharfstein, 2006; Shane and Stuart, 2002).  But far more startups 
successfully exit via acquisitions than via IPOs.  It is important to recognize that performance, 
particularly for entrepreneurial firms, is multidimensional in nature (Chakravarthy, 1986).  The 
limitation of using the fact of IPO or acquisition is that both of these are sensitive to the industry, 
the economic environment, and the founders‟ desire to retain control.  It is best to consider 
multiple performance measures, which is why we look for (and find) robustness with various 
measures.  The variable LOG REVENUES is the revenue for the most recent fiscal year in 
operation as reported by the entrepreneur.  We adjust for inflation (2001 $) and take the natural 
log of this measure for our dependent variable.
10  Out of 2,111 firms, 1,370 survey respondents 
reported revenues for their firms ranging from $0 to $2.56 billion (mean = $34.6 million, median 
= $1.12 million). LAG FROM FOUNDING TO FOUNDING is the number of years from 
founding one firm to founding the next firm.  We use acquisition in event-history models as well.   
To alleviate concerns of response bias where defunct firms might be non-responders, we 
examine the proportions of firms “in operation”, “acquired”, and “out of operation” in the group 
reporting revenues (1424 observations) and the group of non-responders (687 observations) to 
this question.  Our concerns are alleviated in finding that the proportions are roughly equivalent 
with 68.5% of those reporting revenues still in operation and 62.3% of the non-responders still in 
operation.  10.9% of the reporting firms were out of operation whereas that number is 18.8% for 
the non-responders.  19.7% of the reporting firms had been acquired subsequently, while 18.8% 
of the non-responders had been acquired.   
                                                 
10 Adjusting for inflation is not entirely necessary since year dummies are used; however they were 
already calculated for use in descriptive statistics. 16 
 
Independent Variables. We use independent variables related to the characteristics of the 
founding team and the nature of the prior experience, as well as a number of controls.  The key 
independent variable is NUMBER OF START-UPS FOUNDED, which is coded as the ranking of 
the current firm in terms of whether it is the first firm, second, third, and so on (mean = 1.61), 
founded by a given entrepreneur.  For an entrepreneur on her second firm, this variable would be 
coded as a 2.  Since each observation is a single entrepreneur and the total number of his prior 
firms, the observations can be considered independent.  This variable represents a widely used 
measure of the amount of startup experience from which the entrepreneur has had an opportunity 
to learn (Westhead and Wright, 1998; Politis, 2005).  PRIOR IPOS is the number of previous 
IPOs for an entrepreneur‟s previous firms.  The variable PRIOR ACQUISITIONS is a count of 
the number of a founder‟s prior firms which have been acquired.  While survival is often used as 
a performance measure, survival exists among underperforming firms (Gimeno, Folta, Cooper 
and Woo, 1997).  Capturing the similarity of the industrial context, SAME 2-DIGIT SIC CODE is 
a count of the number of prior startups that have the same 2-digit SIC code as the current firm.  
DIFFERENT 2-DIGIT SIC CODE is a count of the number of prior startups with a different 2-
digit SIC code as the current firm.  SIC and VEIC codes were matched from the Dun & 
Bradstreet Million Dollar database and from VentureXpert.  VEIC codes were converted to SIC 
codes with a previously used matching scheme (Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005).   
Control Variables. A set of INDUSTRY DUMMIES controls for the coarse industry 
segment within which the firm competes (such as biotech, software, and electronics).  The 
variable AGE AT FOUNDING is the entrepreneur‟s age when the firm was founded.  Individuals 
also differ in their starting human capital and in particular in the number of years of education 
they have received.  Previous work has also shown a link between education as human capital 17 
 
and the performance of entrepreneurial firms (Bates, 1990, Fairlie and Robb, 2008, Baumol, 
2004, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1991).
11  We control for BACHELOR’S DEGREE and 
MASTER’S DEGREE.  We control for the age of the startup, as measured by OPERATING 
YEARS from founding to the year for which revenues are reported.  A set of YEAR DUMMIES, 
one for each year from 1950-2001, captures temporal changes in the economy.  INITIAL 
CAPITAL is the natural log of the amount of initial capital raised (adjusted to 2001 dollars, 
roughly defined as capital raised within the first year after founding).
12  One alternative 
explanation to learning for which we attempt to control is the possibility that entrepreneurs are 
simply gaining a larger social network as they found successive firms.  The same results held 
when we constructed the sample to include only sole founders (not founding teams) eliminating 
one potential avenue through which a larger social network could improve subsequent firm 
performance.  Entrepreneurs starting a firm in the same geographical location where they started 
a firm previously are likely to enjoy greater networking benefits.  Prior work has shown that 
most communication is with those in closer physical proximity (Allen 1977).  Thus, whether 
through greater contacts with the local financial industry, more peers for discussing 
entrepreneurial ideas, or greater connections to high quality first employees, entrepreneurs 
remaining in the same location should enjoy greater benefits from prior experience in the form of 
                                                 
11 Macroeconomists also have a long tradition of examining the impact of education on growth (Bils and 
Klenow, 2000). Recent reviews of the literature on education and entrepreneurship and on the returns to 
education more generally have been compiled by others (van der Sluis, J., van Praag and Vijverberg, 2004, 
Card, 1999).  Murphy et al. (1991) acknowledge that the direction of causality may be reversed here, 
however:  countries  with  faster  growth  may  provide  more  engineering  jobs  and  may  support  more 
engineering education.  Roberts (1991) shows a curvilinear relationship between education level of high-
tech entrepreneurs and their firms‟ overall performance, with Master‟s degree recipients doing best.  An 
alternative is the signaling argument where an advanced degree signals the individual as a „high type‟ 
who is a quicker learner with lower costs of educational attainment (Spence, 1973).   
12 There is some uncertainty around the way that respondents interpreted the time frame and some may 
have waited for a funding event to found the firm.  While the measure is admittedly not ideal, it is the best 
proxy available, particularly for non-venture capital backed private firms. 18 
 
larger social networks as well as learning the startup process.  Therefore, testing the impact of 
prior learning experience from startups formed in the same location as compared to those formed 
in a different location should allow us to a certain extent to disentangle this social capital effect 
from the increase in human capital.  NUMBER SAME STATE is the number of prior startups by 
the entrepreneur in the same U.S. state as the current startup.  NUMBER DIFFERENT STATE is 
the number of prior startups in a different U.S. state from the current startup. If the benefit from 
prior experience disappears for foundings in different locations then this supports the idea that 
we are observing primarily a social network effect (or that there are performance-influencing 
differences in the characteristics of those entrepreneurs who change locations).   
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.  The number of observations varies due to 
missing observations on the survey items.  Table 2 shows median inflation-adjusted revenues and 
Panel B shows the lag between founding firms.  The trend from a median of $836,000 for first 
firms to $7.27 million for 5
th (or more) firms lends support to Hypothesis 1a that something is 
making subsequent firms more successful. The table also reassures us that we are not simply 
capturing differences between any prior experience and no prior experience.  Table 2 shows the 
standard deviation in the revenues decreases across subsequent firms indicating that founders 
may be growing risk averse or undertaking less ambitious ventures.  While Table 2 suggests a 
decrease in the lag between firms across subsequent ventures, the differences are not statistically 
significant. 
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4. Results 
Multivariate Regressions on Firm Performance 
These descriptive results are suggestive of learning effects.  To more systematically test 
the hypotheses, we use multivariate regressions beginning with a baseline model followed by 
results controlling for factors that may be confounding the results including: 1) individual fixed 
effects and 2) specific firm characteristics, social networks, and fundraising.  We then further 
reinforce the results by testing whether learning effects may speed the timing of events. 
Baseline regressions  
The traditional approach to measuring learning-by-doing for a product is to estimate a power-
law function of the following form:  
C=αX
-β
               (1) 
Where C is the unit cost of the product, α is a constant, X is a measure of experience (prior 
cumulative production in traditional cases and β>0 is the rate of learning-by-doing.  However, this 
approach is not possible in our case because it requires detailed cost data that are not easily available 
for private entrepreneurial firms. Our method for measuring learning-by-doing incorporates learning-
by-doing within a variant of a production function modified to better fit the case of entrepreneurial 
firms.  Traditionally we would write an equation of the form:  
     Y=F(K, L, X)                (2)  
Where Y is the current period performance, K and L are capital stock and quantity of labor, 
respectively, and X is a measure of experience.  The Cobb-Douglas production function is widely 
used, but in the case of entrepreneurial firms, output and capital in particular are extremely difficult 
to measure for a number of reasons.
13  Prior experience of the founders is considered an “input” into 
                                                 
13 For a start-up firm, having raised external capital at all has been viewed by prior literature as a signal of 
performance and thus can be criticized as endogenous to the start-up performance that we are interested in 
measuring. 20 
 
the start-up process in the sense that a higher level of prior experience increases performance 
(controlling for the level of labor and capital).  The coefficient on prior experience denotes the 
learning intensity. First we use the baseline multivariate regressions shown in Table 3.  The 
specification of the regression model is as follows: 
  yit = (’x it)   (3) 
where yit is a measure of firm performance, and the vector xit includes our demographic and firm 
level variables including the number of prior firms.  Subscripts indicate a founding year and 2-
digit SIC code.  Individual fixed effects are not included in this baseline set of models.  Each 
column uses a different performance measure as the dependent variable including revenues (3-1), 
acquisition (3-2), initial public offering (3-3), employees (3-4), and years of survival (3-5).   
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------- 
In Model 3-1, the prior founding experience variables are not significantly associated with higher 
revenues.  The number of employees and firm age are included as controls, so this is an analysis 
of firm productivity.  Model 3-2 shows that the number of prior start-ups which were acquired is 
positively and significantly related to the likelihood that the current firm is acquired.  However, 
starting a new firm in the same 2-digit SIC code is negatively associated with the likelihood of 
acquisition.  Having a male founder, greater numbers of employees, older firms, and being 
located in Massachusetts or California is also correlated with higher likelihood for an acquisition.  
In Model 3-3, none of the key independent variables are associated with the likelihood of an IPO.  
Looking at the number of employees as the dependent variable, Model 3-4 shows that the 
number of prior firms in the same industry is associated with a larger firm size.  Finally, Model 21 
 
3-5 shows that with more prior founding experience, entrepreneurs appear to close subsequent 
firms more quickly.  This is consistent with increasing opportunity costs of running an 
underperforming firm with higher levels of start-up experience. 
Controls for Individual Effects 
  While intriguing, these results are not conclusive, mainly due to the lack of controls for 
individual level differences which may be correlated both with the likelihood of founding 
additional firms and with performance.  The results in Table 4 drop the unchanging individual 
characteristics for education, location, and gender and instead exploit the multiple observations 
on individuals to include individual fixed effects which capture time-invariant differences in 
individuals which may include higher underlying skill, persistence, family wealth, or preferences 
for variety which are likely confounding the earlier estimates.  Again, Model 4-1 finds that the 
prior start-up experience is not associated with higher revenues.  Model 4-2 shows that once 
individual fixed effects are included, higher levels of start-up experience are strongly associated 
with a higher likelihood for acquisition.  However, the coefficient on the number of prior start-
ups which were acquired is strongly negative and significant, indicating that having a prior start-
up decreases the likelihood that the current firm will be acquired (perhaps because these founders 
have either started lifestyle businesses or they are aiming for an IPO).  In Model 4-3, the number 
of prior acquisitions is statistically significant and shows a higher likelihood of an initial public 
offering for the current firm.  None of the prior experience measures in Model 4-4 are associated 
with a greater number of employees.  Model 4-5 looks at survival and finds that while those with 
more prior foundings survive longer, those with more prior firms that were acquired have lower 
survival.  Again this is consistent with a story that prior experience improves survival with a 
moderating effect of prior success which raises opportunity costs and causes individuals to be 22 
 
quicker in shutting down bad firms.  For three out of the five performance and productivity 
measures, some measure of prior founding experience is associated with better outcomes. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------- 
Controls for Detailed Firm Characteristics 
  The analysis thus far is supportive of the idea that there is a learning effect from the 
experience of founding a firm.  However, using the panel data we lack information on certain 
control variables which may be important such as the amount of capital raised, the number of co-
founders and whether the firm received venture capital funding.  It may be that serial 
entrepreneurs are better able to raise capital or to attract more co-founders and that this is 
confounded with learning effects (though they may also be areas where the founder is learning 
how to improve performance).  Controlling for the amount of initial capital also partially 
alleviates concerns that personal wealth may be driving the results.  Survey respondents chose 
one firm to answer more detailed questions regarding the number of co-founders, initial capital, 
etc.  The following regressions take advantage of these controls and the fact that we know where 
this firm is located in the ordering of firms founded for each individual (first firm, second, and so 
on). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
------------------------------- 
To further test these ideas, we condition on having founded at least one prior start-up and 
run the regressions shown in Table 5. Model 5-1 shows that controlling for founder age, 
education, the number of cofounders and initial capital raised, and the number of prior firms 
which went through an acquisition is positively and significantly associated with higher revenues.  
The same result holds in Model 5-2 for the likelihood of acquisition and in 5-3 when a hazard 23 
 
rate model is used rather than a probit.  Model 5-4 uses the fact of IPO as the dependent variable 
and finds that the number of prior IPOs is related to the likelihood of IPO for the current firm.  In 
addition, teams with more cofounders are more likely to have an IPO.  The amount of initial 
capital is also correlated with performance, though a reasonable interpretation is that the more 
promising start-ups were able to raise more money during the first year. 
Cox Hazard and Multivariate Regressions Controlling for Timing 
Table 6 begins to explore the idea suggested by the descriptive statistics that experienced 
entrepreneurs may be able to more quickly go through the start-up process.
14  A Cox (1972) 
hazard rate model is used.  The specification of the Cox (1972) model is as follows: 
         X t X t o exp ) ( |    (4) 
where the vector X includes our founder and first firm experience characteristics.     X t |   is the 
rate at which firms will be acquired at any particular date, given that they have not been acquired 
up until that point in time.  Equation (3) specifies the hazard rate as the product of two 
components: a function of the spell length (i.e. delay time since founding the firm), ) (t o   or 
baseline hazard, and a function of the observable individual and firm characteristics, denoted by 
the vector X. The model estimates the probability of an acquisition in a given year conditional on 
not having been acquired up until that time period.  This model is appropriate for data like ours 
where right-side censoring is a problem because the timing of events is taken into account.  
Subjects start being at risk at the year of founding and the dependent variable is the event of an 
acquisition.  Values above 1.0 represent increases in the hazard of acquisition and values below 
1.0 represent decreases.  Results indicate that NUMBER OF PRIOR STARTUPS (Model 6-1), 
PRIOR ACQUISITIONS (Model 6-2), PRIOR STARTUPS IN THE SAME 2 DIGIT SIC (Model 
                                                 
14 A finding of more quickly executing the start-up process is consistent with either finding a higher 
quality idea or with learning how to design a company (or to filter ideas) for a more rapid exit. 24 
 
6-4) all significantly increase the likelihood of an acquisition.  Both the coefficients on the 
number of prior foundings in the SAME STATE and in a DIFFERENT STATE (Model 6-3) 
increase the likelihood of acquisition and are significant at the 10% level. 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
Table 7 uses multivariate regression to test systematically the relative speed of going 
through the startup process.  This model should be interpreted very carefully since due to right-
hand censoring we should expect to find decreases in lag as a statistical artifact.  Attention 
should be focused solely upon relative differences in lag length rather than on the fact of a 
shorter lag.  An event history model would have been preferable but was not feasible since we 
have no information on who is likely to start another firm but has not yet.  A reduction in lag 
could also be due to differences in style.  The models use the LAG FROM FOUNDING TO 
FOUNDING as the dependent variable, but the results are also robust to the use of the lag from 
closing one firm (whether by closing, bankruptcy, acquisition, or IPO) to founding the next one.  
The specification is that the lag is generated as follows: 
E[yit | x] = λit = exp(’xit)           (5) 
where yit is a measure of lag, and the vector xit includes our demographic and firm level variables 
including the number of prior firms.  Thus, each of our models predicts the lag between 
subsequent firms given a founding year and industry category.  Because the lag is measured in 
years and is a count variable that is always positive, we use Poisson-based econometric 
estimation methods.  The expected lag is an exponential function of a vector of the founder‟s 
prior founding experience and other characteristics x.  We note that by construction this analysis 
limits the sample to those with more than one startup. 25 
 
------------------------------ 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
Model 7-1 shows that PRIOR ACQUISITIONS and PRIOR IPOS are associated with 
shorter lags.  The significance and negative sign of the squared term on AGE AT FOUNDING 
indicate that the relationship between age and lag is curvilinear and concave.  Those with 
Master‟s degrees have a shorter lag than those with just a Bachelor‟s.  Model 7-2 adds a term 
interacting age and prior experience.  Both variables remain significant and the interaction term 
is significant and negative.  This indicates that older entrepreneurs show a greater reduction in 
lag as a result of prior experience.  In Model 7-2 the NUMBER IN THE SAME STATE has a large 
significant impact on reducing lag, and the NUMBER IN A DIFFERENT STATE significantly 
increases the lag.  In Model 7-4 we find that the number of prior startups in the SAME 2-DIGIT 
SIC CODE is associated with a greater decrease in lag than the number in a DIFFERENT 2-
DIGIT SIC CODE (both coefficients are significant).  All regressions indicate that older 
entrepreneurs are slower to go through the process from founding one firm to founding the next.   
5. Conclusion 
Do entrepreneurs benefit from similar effects of learning-by-doing found in 
manufacturing settings?  If so, how valid is the knowledge one gains from experiencing a 
particular situation only one or two times?  The results support the main thesis of the paper 
which is that certain characteristics of individuals and of prior experiences appear to contribute 
to greater learning from small samples of experience.  Our primary proposition, Hypothesis 1a, 
that there are benefits to prior experience even when it is infrequent, is strongly supported.  This 
is the first paper which we know of to test this hypothesis in a model controlling for individual 
fixed effects.  Hypothesis 1b was that conditioning on at least one prior founding, current firm 26 
 
performance would be higher with greater numbers of prior founding experiences and the 
evidence in Table 4 supports this hypothesis.  The regression results in Table 7 indicate that 
older individuals have a longer lag between firms, but show a greater reduction in lag between 
ventures with each prior experience.  Hypothesis 2a was that founders would learn more from 
prior experiences of success.  The data are mixed but tend to support this hypothesis.
15  Model 4-
3 indicates that the number of prior acquisitions has a significant positive impact on the 
likelihood of an IPO.  However, we cannot eliminate the possibility that more is learned from 
failure, yet other mechanisms such as a tarnished reputation affect performance via impact upon 
potential recruits, financiers and even suppliers and customers.   
The regression results in Table 7 and Table 2 show that the ability more quickly to go 
through the entire process of starting a firm, developing it, executing the exit strategy, 
recognizing a new opportunity and founding a new startup, appears to be an interesting area for 
future research. Prior work shows that founding experience aids in raising capital quicker (Hsu, 
2007).  The results appear to support Hypothesis 2b, that individuals remaining in similar 
contexts (SIC code and geographic location) benefit more from small samples of experience.  
The most relevant results here are the relative differences where the reduction in lag for each 
prior founding experience is reversed for those starting a firm in a different state and there is a 
greater lag for those changing industrial contexts. 
The overall pattern of results, under a number of different specifications and measures, 
appears to provide robust evidence supporting a learning-by-doing story.  However, what 
explains the lack of significant results in Tables 3 and 4 on the revenues (and employees) 
measures?  One explanation may be that many high-tech firms do not achieve revenues (or ramp 
                                                 
15 Prior IPOs or acquisitions may be viewed as successes, and are by many other authors, though this 
largely depends on the valuations achieved.   27 
 
up hiring) for the first several years while the focus is on R&D.
16  This interpretation is 
supported by the significant results for acquisitions and by the results in Table 5 where we find 
that PRIOR ACQUISITIONS is significantly associated with higher revenues once we include 
controls for the amount of initial capital and venture capital funding. 
Robustness and Limitations.  An additional empirical implication of a learning 
mechanism would be that inferences from past experience should be more difficult in complex 
environments (Levitt and March, 1988, March, Sproull and Tamuz, 1991).  Both theoretical 
models of complex, turbulent landscapes, and some empirical work suggests that environmental 
or task complexity makes learning more difficult and results in flatter learning slopes 
(Edmondson, Bohmer and Pisano, 2001, Siggelkow and Rivkin, 2005).  Starting a firm in a 
recessionary market can reasonably be expected to be more complex than starting a firm during a 
boom time.  As a further robustness check, Table 8 shows regression results matching the 
founding year of the first start-up attempt with various measures of the economic environment.  
Consistent with reduced learning during complex environments, the results show that the 
subsequent firms have lower revenues if the first firm was started during a recession (as 
measured by the National Bureau of Economic Research recession index). 
This paper infers learning from examining the coefficient on cumulative start-up 
experience.  Taking this empirical approach yields a highly simplified and stylized learning 
model.  Learning-by-doing is only one of many potential mechanisms for learning by individuals 
and organizations (Malerba, 1992, Levitt and March, 1988).  While year and sector dummy 
variables help alleviate concerns that various sources of unobserved heterogeneity drive our 
findings, this concern remains.  One might be concerned that the increases in performance are 
                                                 
16 For many firms undertaking an innovation strategy, significant sales do not occur until after they have 
undergone an acquisition and a larger firm then deploys their complementary assets to drive production 
and sales operations. 28 
 
not the result of learning from prior small samples, but rather from idiosyncratic or lucky private 
decisions by the entrepreneur about which markets or strategies to pursue.  While this is likely 
the case on occasion, the prior experience and founder characteristics analyzed would not be 
expected to have any explanatory power if this was true.  It is possible that entrepreneurs view 
real company performance in terms of high company value or high subjective performance.  The 
current data also may suffer from a self-report bias since both the dependent and some of the 
independent variables were reported by the entrepreneur.  While we observe a wide range of 
outcomes and firm sizes, it is likely that we do not observe every startup firm attempted by the 
entrepreneurs.  Serial entrepreneurs showed a slightly higher response rate than one-time only 
founders and this may have influenced our results.  We also cannot ascertain their reasons for 
deciding to start a new firm or where to locate it.  Perhaps current firm performance is lower for 
entrepreneurs changing states because expectations or a reputation for success or failure alter the 
decision to move locations.  Non-entrepreneurial work experience is another potential source of 
learning (controlled in our models via age at founding and via individual fixed effects).
17  
Unobserved heterogeneity may be influencing our results and including measures of some of 
these other sources of experience may lead to different conclusions.   
Our sample is limited to a survey of founders who at some point attended the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  This is not a random sample of entrepreneurs from the 
entire population nor were they randomly assigned.  Nonetheless, the fact that all the respondents 
are MIT alumni reduces the concern that there are large differences in wealth, skill, or initial 
human capital.  The lowest quality entrepreneurs may be dropping out of the sample.  The 
concern is partially addressed by a paper in process that examines the determinants of starting a 
                                                 
17 Lazear‟s (2004) data are consistent with this type of learning hypothesis where having more varied 
careers may allow individuals to gain diverse enough skills to become an entrepreneur.   29 
 
subsequent firm.
18  Gompers et al. (2006) also find higher performance for those with prior 
entrepreneurial experience but critique a learning-by-doing explanation based on findings that 
founders with prior success (defined as an IPO) are more likely to be successful (IPO) than first 
time entrepreneurs.  Our estimates in Table 4 control for individual fixed effects and should 
control for individual differences in time-invariant underlying ability or persistence.  A skill vs. 
luck story where skill is constant over time requires explanation for why revenues appear to 
continue to increase (and variation decrease) with the number of prior start-ups (successful or 
not) even when conditioning on at least one prior start-up. 
The results indicate substantial benefit from even small samples of prior experience in 
this setting of founding and developing new firms.  Second, older individuals as compared to 
their younger counterparts appear slightly better at acquiring and using knowledge from small 
samples of prior founding experience to reduce the amount of time necessary to go through the 
start-up process.
19  Third, prior experience in the same industry has a positive effect on current 
firm performance in some models, but seems to have its greatest effect on the speed from 
founding to acquisition.  Areas where entrepreneurs show possible learning effects include the 
inclination and/or ability to more quickly go through the entire process of starting a firm, 
developing it, executing the exit strategy, and recognizing and initiating a new opportunity.   
Rather than a strict line between exploration with little to no prior experience and 
exploitation of a familiar area, future work should think more in terms of which components of 
the experience are familiar (Fleming, 2001).  If strategies are discovered for extending learning 
from small samples, they may also be useful in squeezing even more learning from large samples 
                                                 
18 The middle range of performers (in terms of revenues) are most likely to start a subsequent firm, 
whereas both low and very high levels of revenue are associated with a lower likelihood of a subsequent 
firm (Eesley and Roberts, working paper).   
19 Perhaps wisdom accompanies age and enhances learning capability or the filtering of what pieces of 
information from past experiences apply to current contexts. 30 
 
of experience.  While significant challenges remain inherent in any attempt to learn from sparse 
samples of experience, a clearer understanding of the issues involved is invaluable for 
entrepreneurs and policy makers attempting to learn from history.  For the literature on learning-
by-doing, the results indicate that there are external transfers of learning-by-doing via the exit 
and subsequent founding activity of the entrepreneurs, even in the context of small samples of 
relatively heterogeneous events.  For entrepreneurs, the results have the implication that it may 
be preferable to look for co-founders with prior entrepreneurial experience in the same industry 
and possibly that it is better to start an entrepreneurial career early.
20  The results may also have 
implications for market structure since they show a mechanism where otherwise proprietary 
learning-by-doing may be transferred outside of the firm, benefiting entrepreneurial firms and 
potentially harming the leading firm.  Market structure may also have effects on learning (Lester 
and McCabe, 1993).  Finally, for policy, the results indicate that programs that encourage early 
founding attempts or that encourage first time entrepreneurs to use their knowledge gained to 
found another firm may have significant economic benefits.
21  The contribution of this paper is to 
provide empirical evidence that, even in the context of infrequent tasks and strategic settings, it 
may be possible to learn from rare (i.e., small samples of) prior experience.  
                                                 
20 However, caution should be exercised here since the paper does not attempt to determine the impact of 
prior founding experience in comparison with what would have occurred if the individual gained 
additional employment experience instead.   
21 Certain types of government intervention have been explored and it appears that regulators can induce 
learning through light-handed regulation (Lewis and Yildirim, 2002). 31 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
LOG REVENUES  1264  14.05  3.08  0.03  21.66 
ACQUIRED  1840  0.19  0.39  0  1 
IPO  1790  0.11  0.32  0  1 
LAG BETWEEN  1502  12.11  9.41  0  50 
NUMBER OF FIRMS  2058  1.61  1.30  1  11 
PRIOR ACQUISITIONS  2067  0.13  0.42  0  3 
PRIOR IPOS  2067  0.04  0.23  0  3 
PRIOR SAME SIC  1473  0.02  0.14  0  2 
PRIOR DIFFERENT SIC  1473  0.02  0.18  0  3 
PRIOR FOUNDINGS IN THE SAME STATE  2067  0.38  0.90  0  8 
PRIOR FOUNDINGS IN A DIFFERENT STATE  2067  0.23  0.79  0  7 
AGE FOUNDED  1807  39.65  10.59  18  83 
AGE FOUNDED SQUARED  1807  1684.19  920.07  324  6889 
BACHELOR'S DEGREE  2000  0.43  0.49  0  1 
MASTER'S DEGREE  2000  0.41  0.49  0  1 
OPERATING YEARS  1837  14.34  11.30  0  74 
INDUSTRY  1600  9.77  4.34  1  16 
NUMBER OF COFOUNDERS  2056  1.05  1.22  0  4 
VC FUNDED  1691  0.13  0.34  0  1 
LOG INITIAL CAPITAL  1264  11.91  2.72  0.28  21.02 38 
 
TABLE 2  
Revenues and Lag Across Ventures 
Panel A – Likelihood of Exit Events and Revenues (in 2001 dollars) 
Firm Rank 
 
1
st firms 
(N=556) 
2
nd firms 
(N=182) 
3
rd firms 
(N=84) 
4
th firms 
(N=21) 
5
th firms 
and 
higher 
(N=36) 
Median Revenues („000‟s)  836  1,784  924  1,181  7,274 
Standard Dev. („000‟s)  153,000  117,000  130,000  10,800  21,200 
 
Panel B – Lag (from graduation and from the prior firm founding) 
Firm Rank 
 
1
st firms 
(N=761) 
2
nd firms 
(N=241) 
3
rd firms 
(N=150) 
4
th firms 
(N=71) 
5
th firms 
and 
higher 
(N=31) 
Lag Between Subsequent Firms 
(years)  14.02  7.95  7.38  6.99  6.71 
Lag St. Dev.  9.78  6.90  6.73  5.42  6.37 
 39 
 
 
TABLE 3 
Productivity Regressions 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Independent Variables 
LN(REVENUES) 
(3-1) 
PR(ACQUIRED) 
(3-2) 
PR(IPO) 
(3-3) 
LN(EMPL) 
(3-4) 
LN(SURVIVAL) 
(3-5) 
NUM. OF START-UPS 
FOUNDED  -0.269  (0.206)  0.040  (0.051)  0.002  (0.069)  0.066  (0.057)  -0.028*  (0.016) 
NUM. PRIOR ACQUIRED  0.121  (0.328)  0.396***  (0.087)  0.084  (0.116)  0.160  (0.103)  0.058  (0.024) 
NUM. SAME 2 DIGIT SIC  0.396  (0.456)  -0.239*  (0.125)  -0.014  (0.161)  0.442***  (0.143)  0.014  (0.034) 
AGE AT FOUNDING YEAR  0.025  (0.013)  -0.012***  (0.004)  0.001  (0.005)  -0.012***  (0.004)  0.006  (0.001) 
GENDER (1=MALE)  1.179***  (0.648)  0.404**  (0.202)  0.372  (0.289)  0.582***  (0.153)  0.059  (0.052) 
MASTERS  -0.237***  (0.287)  -0.016  (0.076)  0.170*  (0.103)  0.305***  (0.086)  0.040  (0.028) 
DOCTORATE  -0.183*  (0.409)  -0.192*  (0.102)  0.117  (0.130)  0.181  (0.121)  0.111  (0.036) 
LN(EMP)  1.752  (0.292)  0.055***  (0.019)  0.188***  (0.025)         
LN(FIRM AGE)  0.539  (0.076)  0.173***  (0.057)  0.358***  (0.097)  0.532***  (0.074)     
MA  -0.546*  (0.332)  0.330***  (0.081)  0.260***  (0.104)  0.214**  (0.098)  -0.021  (0.030) 
CA  -0.177  (0.346)  0.389***  (0.092)  0.440***  (0.123)  -0.030  (0.102)  0.010  (0.033) 
CONSTANT  -13.826  (3.467)  -1.422  (1.347)  -2.543***  (0.994)  -3.290***  (0.626)  1.412***  (0.198) 
Year F.E.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
SIC F.E.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Individual F.E.  NO  NO  NO  NO  NO 
R-squared  0.2164  0.160  0.228  0.150  0.622 
Num. of obs.  1294  1997  1760  2092  2217 40 
 
TABLE 4 
Productivity Analysis Including Individual Fixed Effects 
 
Independent Variables 
LN(REVENUES)  PR(ACQUIRED)  PR(IPO)  LN(EMPLOYEES)  LN(SURVIVAL) 
(4-1)  (4-2)  (4-3)  (4-4)  (4-5) 
NUM. OF START-UPS FOUNDED  0.597  (0.551)  2.326***  (0.181)  -0.099  (0.074)  0.029  (0.129)  0.161***  (0.043) 
NUM. PRIOR ACQUIRED  -0.028  (0.747)  -5.105***  (0.221)  0.331***  (0.114)  0.078  (0.186)  -0.119**  (0.060) 
NUM. SAME 2 DIGIT SIC  -0.573  (0.799)  -0.298  (0.248)  0.090  (0.154)  -0.034  (0.208)  0.010  (0.064) 
AGE AT FOUNDING YEAR  0.363**  (0.160)  -0.103***  (0.010)  0.000  (0.005)  -0.016  (0.011)  0.013  (0.013) 
LN(EMP)  1.208***  (0.598)  -0.099**  (0.045)  0.158***  (0.025)         
LN(FIRM AGE)  1.730**  (0.482)  0.359**  (0.157)  0.394***  (0.093)  0.322**  (0.145)      
CONSTANT  -29.591***  (9.765)  -0.126***  (0.066)  -2.105**  (0.959)  -0.643  (1.137)  3.683***  (0.496) 
Year F.E.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
SIC F.E.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Individual F.E.  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
R-squared  0.740  0.750  0.206  0.750  0.884 
Num. of obs.  1528  463  1771  2135  2231 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 5 
Effects of Prior Entrepreneurial Experience 
(Conditioned on having founded at least one prior startup) 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Dependent variables  LN REVENUES  PR(ACQUISTION)  PR(ACQUISITION)  PR(IPO)      
Independent variables  Model 5-1 
OLS 
Model 5-2 
Probit 
Model 5-3 
Cox Hazard 
Model 5-5  
Probit 
FOUNDER CHAR. 
AGE AT FOUNDING 
 
NUMBER OF 
COFOUNDERS 
 
PRIOR EXPER. CHAR. 
PRIOR ACQUISITIONS  
 
PRIOR IPOS 
 
CONTROLS 
BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
 
MASTER’S DEGREE 
 
OPERATING YEARS 
 
INITIAL CAPITAL 
 
VC FUNDED 
 
INDUSTRY SEGMENTS 
YEAR DUMMIES 
CONSTANT 
 
Log-likelihood 

2-Statistic (or R-squared) 
p-value (or Prob>F) 
Number of obs. 
 
0.002 
(0.014) 
0.056 
(0.118) 
 
 
0.417** 
(0.212) 
0.132 
(0.361) 
 
-0.078 
(0.438) 
0.433 
(0.430) 
0.067* 
(0.039) 
0.411*** 
(0.070) 
-0.089 
(0.462) 
YES 
YES 
13.642*** 
(3.446) 
-- 
0.432 
0.000 
347 
 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
0.024 
(0.079) 
 
 
0.389*** 
(0.145) 
0.350 
(0.252) 
 
0.548* 
(0.309) 
0.478 
(0.312) 
-0.043* 
(0.025) 
0.111* 
(0.049) 
0.519* 
(0.304) 
YES 
YES 
-1.281 
(1.655) 
-124.3 
125.1 
0.000 
345 
 
0.999 
(0.012) 
2.057*** 
(0.784) 
 
 
1.987* 
(0.775) 
1.003 
(0.089) 
 
1.529** 
(0.227) 
1.117 
(0.268) 
0.859*** 
(0.016) 
1.209*** 
(0.069) 
1.653* 
(0.518) 
YES 
YES 
-- 
 
-371.78 
138.18 
0.000 
439 
 
0.009 
(0.014) 
0.192*** 
(0.096) 
 
 
0.099 
(0.195) 
0.427* 
(0.244) 
 
0.046 
(0.428) 
0.087 
(0.429) 
0.048 
(0.042) 
0.115* 
(0.063) 
-0.140 
(0.366) 
YES 
YES 
dropped 
 
-78.9 
65.9 
0.008 
222 42 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Cox Hazard Rate Regressions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively; hazard 
ratio and standard errors reported; 374 firms, 53 events and 6,167 obs. 
  Dep. Variable = Acquisition year 
(subjects start being at risk at year of 
founding) 
Note: reported coefficients are hazard ratios     
Independent variables  Model 6-1  Model 6-2  Model 6-3  Model 6-4 
Founder char. 
AGE AT FOUNDING 
 
# OF START-UPS FOUNDED 
 
NUMBER OF COFOUNDERS 
 
PRIOR EXPERIENCE CHAR. 
PRIOR ACQUISITIONS  
 
PRIOR IPOS 
 
SAME STATE 
 
DIFFERENT STATE 
 
SAME 2 DIGIT SIC 
 
DIFFERENT 2 DIGIT SIC 
 
CONTROLS 
BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
 
MASTER’S DEGREE 
 
OPERATING YEARS 
 
INITIAL CAPITAL 
 
VC FUNDED 
 
INDUSTRY SEGMENTS 
Prob > chi2 
LR chi2 
(df) 
 
0.989 
(0.034) 
2.224** 
(1.444) 
1.551 
(0.492) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
 
0.968 
(0.423) 
0.720 
(0.316) 
0.901*** 
(0.018) 
1.151** 
(0.093) 
3.116** 
(1.633) 
YES 
0.000 
77.95 
21 
 
0.955** 
(0.021) 
-- 
 
1.563 
(0.527) 
 
2.011*** 
(0.370) 
1.777 
(0.759) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
 
0.959 
(0.425) 
0.702 
(0.315) 
0.884*** 
(0.019) 
1.116 
(0.091) 
2.988** 
(1.553) 
YES 
0.000 
88.85 
22 
 
0.969 
(0.020) 
-- 
 
1.489 
(0.470) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
1.255** 
(0.171) 
1.333** 
(0.234) 
-- 
 
-- 
 
 
 
0.827 
(0.374) 
0.673 
(0.298) 
0.902*** 
(0.018) 
1.141** 
(0.092) 
3.048** 
(1.597) 
YES 
0.000 
77.85 
22 
 
0.965 
(0.029) 
-- 
 
1.578 
(0.928) 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
-- 
 
37.621** 
(56.90) 
3.675 
(3.015) 
 
 
0.491 
(0.308) 
1.508 
(0.667) 
0.856*** 
(0.029) 
1.209 
(0.153) 
3.428** 
(2.637) 
YES 
0.000 
76.07 
22 43 
 
TABLE 7 
Poisson Regression using Lag to Next Founding 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Dep. Variable  Lag from founding to founding 
(N=587) 
Independent variables  Model 7-1  Model 7-2  Model 7-3  Model 7-4  
FOUNDER CHAR. 
AGE AT FOUNDING 
 
AGE INTERACTION W/ EXP. 
 
AGE AT FOUNDING
2 
 
NUMBER OF STARTUPS 
FOUNDED 
PRIOR EXPERIENCE CHAR. 
PRIOR ACQUISITIONS  
 
PRIOR IPOS  
 
# SAME STATE 
 
# DIFFERENT STATE 
 
SAME 2-DIGIT SIC CODE 
 
DIFFERENT 2-DIGIT SIC CODE 
 
CONTROLS 
INITIAL CAPITAL 
 
BACHELOR’S DEGREE 
 
MASTER’S DEGREE 
 
INDUSTRY SEGMENTS 
YEAR DUMMIES 
Constant 
 
Prob > chi2 
Pseudo R-squared 
 
0.201*** 
(0.012) 
 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
-0.334*** 
(0.036) 
-0.484*** 
(0.070) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.012** 
(0.006) 
0.243*** 
(0.041) 
0.109*** 
(0.041) 
YES 
YES 
-2.555*** 
(0.453) 
0.000 
0.353 
 
0.067*** 
(0.002) 
-0.010*** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.084** 
(0.032) 
0.060** 
(0.022) 
 
 
 
 
 
0.009* 
(0.006) 
0.288*** 
(0.041) 
0.137*** 
(0.042) 
YES 
YES 
-0.268 
(0.382) 
0.000 
0.464 
 
0.082*** 
(0.003) 
-0.022*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
-0.511*** 
(0.086) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.011** 
(0.006) 
0.287*** 
(0.041) 
0.121*** 
(0.042) 
YES 
YES 
-0.904** 
(0.397) 
0.000 
0.466 
 
0.197*** 
(0.014) 
 
 
-0.002*** 
(0.0001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.039*** 
(0.159) 
-0.706*** 
(0.108) 
 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.349*** 
(0.047) 
0.147** 
(0.047) 
YES 
YES 
-3.011*** 
(0.474) 
0.000 
0.502 44 
 
TABLE 8 
Impact of Environmental Complexity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
Independent variables  Dep. Var.=Ln(Revenues) 
NYSE AT FIRST FOUNDING YEAR  4.61E-10**  (0.000) 
NBER RECESSION INDEX AT FIRST 
FOUNDING YEAR 
-3.384* 
 
(1.883) 
 
VC DISBURSEMENTS AT FIRST 
FOUNDING YEAR 
-0.033 
 
(0.028) 
 
NUM. OF PRIOR STARTUPS FOUNDED  0.831***  (0.306) 
SAME SIC  2.543***  (0.893) 
HELD PATENTS  1.352***  (0.349) 
AGE AT FOUNDING  -0.022*  (0.012) 
NUMBER OF COFOUNDERS  0.283***  (0.095) 
OPERATING YEARS  0.067***  (0.023) 
LN(INITIAL CAPITAL)  0.349***  (0.051) 
VC FUNDED  0.452  (0.360) 
MASS. LOCATED  -0.108  (0.271) 
CALIFORNIA LOCATED  -0.042  (0.307) 
INDUSTRY SEGMENTS  YES 
YEAR DUMMIES  YES 
OBSERVATIONS  629 
ADJ. R-SQUARED  0.392 45 
 
Appendix A 
Comparison of Key Demographic Characteristics by Survey 
 
 
Variable   Responded to 2001 
survey 
(N=43,668) 
Did not respond to 
2001 survey 
(N=62,260) 
t-stat for equal 
means 
Male              0.83  0.86  10.11 
Engineering major  0.48  0.47  -4.49 
Management major  0.16  0.15  -5.75 
Science major  0.23  0.23  0.37 
Social sciences major  0.05  0.06  4.07 
Architecture major  0.06  0.08  11.82 
Non-US citizen  0.81  0.82  3.77 
North American (not US) 
citizen 
0.13  0.11  -4.14 
Latin American citizen  0.13  0.12  -1.44 
Asian citizen  0.33  0.34  1.45 
European citizen  0.30  0.26  -5.08 
Middle Eastern citizen  0.05  0.08  6.32 
African citizen  0.03  0.05  6.25 
   
Variable  Responded to 2003 
survey 
(N=2,111) 
Did not respond to 
2003 survey 
(N=6,131) 
t-stat for equal 
means 
Male              0.92  0.92  0.12 
Engineering major  0.52  0.47  -3.63 
Management major  0.17  0.21  4.17 
Science major  0.17  0.18  1.09 
Social sciences major  0.06  0.05  1.18 
Architecture major  0.09  0.09  1.06 
Non-US citizen  0.82  0.81  -1.36 
North American (not US) 
citizen 
0.17  0.14  -1.34 
Latin American citizen  0.19  0.19  0.13 
Asian citizen  0.22  0.24  0.73 
European citizen  0.31  0.32  0.38 
Middle Eastern citizen  0.08  0.07  -0.59 
African citizen  0.04  0.04  0.17 
 
Note: bolded numbers indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.  
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Appendix B 
Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) develop an information-theoretic model that we apply to 
relate learning by doing to heterogeneity in the performance of entrepreneurial firms. Learning-
by-doing has been modeled in a number of different formulations (Muth, 1986, Levitt and March, 
1988, Jovanovic and Nyarko, 1995).  Nonetheless, it is typically thought of as the result of search 
for more optimal routines via experimentation and trial and error search.  An advantage of this 
model is that it allows for multiple (N-task) activities each with an optimal level and it has been 
extended to the case of multiple technologies each with a human capital-specific component. The 
model links differences in the learning rate to the impact on heterogeneity of firm performance.  
Another advantage is that the model is agnostic to whether the experienced entrepreneur is 
accessing better ideas or is able to find more optimal ways to commercialize an idea, holding 
idea quality constant.  It is difficult for our data to tease these apart and while this represents a 
promising area for future research, the model allows both to be included in a learning-by-doing 
model. The many technical details can be found in Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995), so we 
relatively succinctly summarize the model.  Entrepreneurs make decisions affecting the 
efficiency of start-up (production) activity. The efficiency results from how far these decisions 
are from the optimal values. The efficiency q on the ith start-up (production run) is defined as:  
      (1) 
where j=1, 2, 3, …, N and N is the number of tasks that activity requires, zj is the decision for the 
jth task, and yj is the “optimal” for the jth task. The maximum level of efficiency is A, and 
efficiency is maximized at z=y. The ideal level „y‟ is a random variable that the decision-makers 
do not have complete information about, prior to production. Specifically,  
y = θ + w             (2)  47 
 
where θ represents the optimal way (on average) to perform the activity, and w represents 
transitory disturbances that have zero mean and variance σ
2
w.  Entrepreneurs know the variance of 
θ, σ
2
θ, but do not know its mean. Upon founding a firm, entrepreneurs use information gained from 
the outcome of that founding to revise their estimates of the mean of θ. As the number of start-ups 
increases (production runs in the original model), entrepreneurs (decision-makers in the original 
model) have increasingly precise estimates of the mean of θ.  However, due to the presence of 
disturbances, the entrepreneur never knows it precisely.  The equation for the expected efficiency 
of production run τ derived by Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995) is:  
Eτ(qτ) = A(1- xτ - σ
2
w)
N        (3)  
where xτ= σ
2
w σ
2
θ /( σ
2
w+ τ.σ
2
θ). Noting that xτ=0 as the number of start-ups (production runs) 
tends to infinity, we can define the eventual expected efficiency as  
E(q*) = A(1- σ
2
w)
N          (4) 
The learning curve in this model is primarily a function of the disturbances in the signal 
of the optimal decisions, the uncertainty in the optimal decision on each task, and the number of 
tasks. 